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Abstract
Organised crime is unique within the underground economy. Unlike individual
criminals, criminal organisations can substitute between a variety of inputs; chiefly
violence and labour. This paper considers the effect of several popular anti-crime
policies in such an environment. Using a standard framework, I find that certain
policies may cause the organisation to reduce its membership in favour of more
intense violence. Others may lead to increases in membership. Consequently,
policies designed to reduce the social loss suffered as a result of criminal activities
may actually increase it. Results prove robust to differences in hiring practices on
the part of the criminal organisation.
Keywords: Organised crime; Crime policy; Occupational choice.
JEL: J24, J28, K42
1 Introduction
Over recent years, a myriad of policies have been suggested to tackle youth involve-
ment in crime. The reason for this is simple: crime inflicts a cost upon society. Recent
estimates (Cohen and Piquero 2009) place the average present value to society of sav-
ing one high-risk eighteen year-old from a life of crime between $2.6 million and $5.3
million. This includes between £675,000 and $1 million in lost productivity. Over the
last decade, estimates of these costs have increased substantially. In an earlier study
employing a similar approach (Cohen 1998), the headline cost was between $1.7 million
and $2.3 million, with lost productivity accounting for around £155,000. Admittedly,
a large proportion of the increase is the result of improvements in measurement tech-
niques. Nevertheless, crime is much more costly than hitherto imagined. The individual
involved suffers from foregone education, likely drug use, and potential punishment.
Wider society is forced to invest in security, pay for public prosecution and incarcera-
tion, and suffer from victimisation and the fear of crime. A recent survey (Egley and
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Howell 2011) estimated that there are 28,100 gangs active in the US, employing some
731,000 individuals. Combined with Cohen and Piquero’s estimates, the annual cost of
youth involvement in organised crime may be as high as $465 billion in the US, or 3%
of US GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2011)1. The recent intensification of research
into these policies is therefore unsurprising.
This paper develops a simple framework in which to study a criminal organisation’s
likely reaction to the implementation of policy. A profit-maximising gang has two avail-
able inputs, labour and violence, which it uses generate revenue through illegal activity.
Heterogeneous youths grow up in the gang’s neighbourhood. During their early years,
youths have the opportunity to acquire criminal skills which desensitise them to violence.
They then decide where to seek employment. If they join the formal economy, they are
paid a flat wage. If instead they opt for a criminal career, they join the gang. The
gang requires that they inflict violence. The exact amount of violence, and the form of
compensation provided, depends upon the gang’s ability to discriminate between youths
with different abilities. At its most simple, the gang will offer a flat wage, and require
all youths to inflict the same amount of violence. A separating gang, on the other hand,
may offer a range of different wages, each associated with a different level of violence.
When a policy is introduced that affects the youths’ incentives, the gang’s reaction
depends upon how varying of inputs affects profit. If violence and size are complementary
in the profit function, any policy that aims to reduce the incentive to join the gang also
reduces the amount of violence the gang employs, unequivocally lowering the social loss
from crime. If, on the other hand, violence and size are profit substitutes, a variety
of outcomes may arise. Falling size may cause the gang to substitute towards violence
(in a similar manner to Poutvaara and Priks 2009 and 2011) or vice versa. Perversely,
this could increase the social cost of crime. Policies are therefore most effective when
they not only reduce gang membership, but also hamper the gang’s ability to intensify
violence. For example, prevention of juvenile crime may prove particularly effective. It
not only increases the opportunity cost of crime, but also reduces youths’ ability to learn
criminal skills, making them more sensitive to violence. Conversely, improving labour
market conditions, conditional on a youth still choosing to become a criminal, have no
impact upon their incentives to learn criminal skills. Whilst membership is reduced,
such policies unambiguously increases the marginal profitability of violence, causing the
gang to intensify its activities.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related liter-
1Cohen and Piquero use a constant 2% discount rate. Author’s estimates are based upon youths
being active from age 18 to 26 and use 2009 US nominal GDP.
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ature, outlining some important ‘stylised facts’ about organised crime. In the following
section, I introduce a model of recruitment to organised crime, and define two different
types of gang. In Section 4 I discuss the behaviour of the first of these types: one which
can only offer a single wage and violence contract. Having done this, Section 5 discusses
the likely impact of policy under various conditions, and highlights where policies may
have unintended consequences. Section 6 extends the analysis, discussing a situation in
which the gang can offer a range of jobs to youths. Section 7 considers the effects of
policy in this more complicated setting. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Criminal Organisations as Firms
Two approaches are often employed when considering the activities of organised crime,
reflecting two different literatures. Those considering the origins of criminal organi-
sations (for example Gambetta 1996, Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997, Anderson and
Bandiera 2000 or Dixit 2007) think of them as pseudo-states, filling the void left by
weak law enforcement. This literature views a local monopoly over violence as the
defining characteristics of organised crime. Conversely, it is through the lens of a
profit-maximising firm that established criminal organisations are most successfully anal-
ysed (for example Garoupa 2000, Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005 or Kugler, Verdier, and
Zenou 2005). This paper adopts the second approach, whilst incorporating elements of
the first.
Criminal organisations are not regular firms; their property rights are not protected
by statute, nor are their activities constrained by it. They operate under constant
(violent) threat from law enforcement agencies, as well as competitors. As such, their
factors of production are slightly different. The economic and criminological literatures
point to two inputs being common to all flavours of criminal organisation: number of
members and violence.
In addition to labour’s traditional role in production (Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005),
there are several economies of scale that a larger organisation is able to take advantage
of. Transactions within illegal markets are fraught with risk. Partners are prone to
cheating one another. There is a constant threat from undercover police officers. These
informational asymmetries lead to a reduction in trade (Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh, and
Braga 2007) giving rise to the usual inefficiencies (from the criminal organisation’s per-
spective, at least). By vouching for its members, and inflicting severe punishments on
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those who renege, a large criminal organisation enables trade to take place. Membership
acts as a guarantee. They also make it harder for police to infiltrate them by being more
self-sufficient.
Larger criminal organisations can also stretch police resources (Sah 1991). As the
number of members increases, the probability than any one individual will be arrested
diminishes. Consequently, larger organisations suffer proportionally less from police
disruption.
Violence is the other key component of criminal enterprises. Firms operating a
protection racket must be willing and able to use violence against those who damage
their clients’ businesses (Gambetta 1996, Dixit 2007). As protection often evolves into
extortion, violence may also be required to ensure that clients continue to pay their fees
(Garoupa 2000). Violence (more frequently, the threat of violence) can thus be seen as
a direct input into the criminal organisation’s production function.
Violence is equally important as a mechanism for reducing disruption to the organisa-
tion’s other operations. As it is impossible to operate in isolation, numerous stakeholders
will, over time, gain information that could implicate the organisation in various illegal
activities. Of these stakeholders, the ones with the greatest potential to cause harm are
its members. Baccara and Bar-Isaac 2008 consider the problem of information diffusion
within a network design framework. Where the threat of violence is credible, and suffi-
cient to prevent members implicating the organisation, a hierarchical structure proves to
be optimal. Information is passed throughout the organisation efficiently. Organisations,
such as terrorist groups, who cannot rely on their members not to share information,
are forced into a much less efficient cell structure. Finally, criminal organisations use
violence to protect their local monopolies from competitors (Silverman 2004).
Irrespective of which illegal market(s) the organisation is operating in, size and vio-
lence are revenue complements. Members of more violent groups suffer less disruption,
enjoy stronger monopolies, and may even be able to extort higher prices. In other
words, the aggregate marginal revenue product of labour is increasing in violence, and
vice versa.
Criminal organisations’ costs are primarily the wages paid to their members. Whilst
the organisation’s leaders dictate the extent of violence employed, it is the foot soldiers
that face the cost of implementing it during the commission of their crimes. Levitt
and Venkatesh 2000 show that, over a four-year period, members of drug-selling gang
in Chicago had a 25% chance of dying (versus a 0.4% chance nationwide in the same
demographic). Over the same period, they also suffered an average of two non-fatal
injuries (ranging from gunshots and knife wounds to beatings). In order to attract and
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retain members, wages must incorporate compensation for the violence they are forced
to inflict. This provides an incentive for criminal organisations to substitute between size
and violence. By increasing the amount of violence it requires its members to employ,
the organisation’s wage bill grows substantially, as each member must be compensated.
In this sense, the marginal cost of size is also increasing in violence, and vice versa.
Whether violence and size are complements or substitutes in the organisation’s profit
function depends upon which effect dominates. When the gang’s size increase, the
marginal revenue it derives from violence also increases. This provides an incentive to
increase violence. However, any increase in violence requires that the gang compensate
its members. With a larger gang, more members need to be compensated. As such, an
increase in size also increases the marginal cost of violence. Whether violence’s prof-
itability increases when size increases clearly depends upon whether marginal revenue or
marginal cost increases more. This will play a key role in determining the effectiveness
of policy.
2.2 Opportunities in a Criminal Neighbourhood
Youths growing up within a criminal organisation’s territory face several difficulties
when seeking work in the primary labour market. Such neighbourhoods tend to develop
reputations for criminal activity. If this leads employers to reduce their expectations
regarding prospective employees’ productivity from that neighbourhood, finding a job
could be more challenging (Verdier and Zenou 2004). In turn, poor prospects provide
less incentive to acquire human capital, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Lundberg and
Startz 1983). Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005 suggest that this may be compounded by
peer pressure, providing a further disincentive to acquire the skills necessary to seek
employment. The opportunities open to youths from such a neighbourhood are thus
often severely limited in the primary labour market.
In sharp contrast, opportunities abound in the informal economy. Success in this
industry requires the acquisition of a different set of (criminal) skills. Youths must
develop an acceptance of, and willingness to use, violence. Ballester, Calvo-Armengol,
and Zenou 2010 explore the acquisition of criminal skill in a network. They suggest that
youths may acquire such skills through a mixture of trial and error (relatively costly
juvenile crime), and observing others’ mistakes. They suggest that youths who feature
centrally in a juvenile network will find skill acquisition far easier. They can observe
others more easily, suffering less from trial and error. This can lead to a great deal of
heterogeneity in the amount of criminal skill acquired.
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There is a broad range of criminological evidence in support of such a learning process
for the use of violence. Various works by Athens (summarised in Rhodes 2001) identify
a common process of ‘violentization’ undergone by a large sample of prisoners incarcer-
ated for violent crime. During this process, individuals are first desensitised to violence,
before learning (through positive reinforcement) that it is an appropriate response to
minor provocations. Jankowski 1991 notes a similar process at work in low income neigh-
bourhoods, which he calls ‘defiant individualism’. Both authors suggest that juvenile
gangs play an important role in this system. Esbensen and Lynskey 2001 interviewed
fourteen year-olds in the US who claimed to be members of a juvenile gang. Of those,
25% claimed to have shot at someone. FBI statistics back up this claim. 80% of gang
murders in 2009 were attributed to juvenile gangs (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010).
2.3 Tackling Organised Crime
Policies designed to tackle crime, and organised crime in particular, are motivated by
the fact that crime is costly to society. The scale of the total loss is ultimately related to
the the organisation’s two transient features - intensity of violence and membership size.
In particular, criminal organisations inflict three main externalities. As with all crime,
by far the largest (Cohen and Piquero 2009) is the fear of crime and victimisation costs
that crime generates. With a larger gang, one would expect that more individuals are
going to be victims of crime. Moreover, the loss each individual suffers will be increasing
in the amount of violence inflicted during the commission of each crime.
Secondly, society must expend resources protecting itself from the gang. This in-
cludes the cost the policies discussed herein and the measures taken by individuals to
protect themselves. Once more, we would expect these costs to be increasing in both size
and violence. With more members, crime is more prevalent. The chance of becoming
a victim of crime is higher. More crimes will need investigation, and will lead to more
prosecutions. If violence is higher, a victim suffers a greater loss. The return to investing
in protection is higher and more investment will occur.
Finally, criminal organisations can be the cause of economic discrimination a` la
Lundberg and Startz 1983. It is possible that even youths who gain positive surplus
by joining the gang would do better in the primary labour market if the gang were
not present. Without the gang, no negative signal about the neighbourhood would be
generated and youths would be offered higher wages. In this sense, the gang is a source
of economic discrimination2. Again, we would expect the extent of the discrimination to
2Indeed, the gang has an incentive to maximise the discrimination against youths from its neigh-
bourhood. Discrimination will enable it to offer lower wages for the same amount of violence.
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be increasing in both size and violence. If the gang is larger, fewer youths will acquire
primary labour market skills. As such, the average amount of skill acquired will be lower.
This will lead to lower wage offers. Similarly, if the gang is more violent, employers are
likely to have a more critical opinion of those from the neighbourhood. Again, lower
wage offers will result.
Since the inception of the economics of crime, economists have been suggesting poli-
cies to reduce criminal activity. In Becker’s seminal paper of 1968, he proposed that
a relatively cheap way to reduce crime was to simply increase the severity of punish-
ment (fine) incurred when caught. By increasing the size of fine, the expected payoff to
committing crime is reduced, given a constant arrest rate. This reduces the incentive
to become involved in crime, relative to staying honest. Since then, an abundance of
policies have been put forward, each aiming to manipulate the incentives of would-be
criminals. This paper considers four broad categories:
1. Increasing the severity of punishment;
2. increasing arrest and conviction rates;
3. primary labour market policies; and
4. prevention of juvenile crime.
Another Beckerian policy involves increasing arrest and conviction rates. At first
pass, the effect should be equivalent to increasing the fine. However, when we turn
our attention to organised crime, this equivalence breaks down. Increasing arrest rates
reduces the number of members available for the organisation to utilise (what Levitt 1996
calls the incapacitation effect). This, in turn, will impact upon the wages they are willing
to offer, and even their optimal levels of violence. Whilst increasing the length of prison
terms may have similar effects, other increases in severity may not.
Primary labour market policies cover an extremely broad range of suggestions, all
aiming to increase the wage paid in the formal economy. A by-product of this is a fall
in crime. Two cases stand out, however, for their direct targeting of high-risk youths.
The now famous Perry Preschool Programme (see Parks 2000), focused on poor black
preschool children with low IQs in the 1960s. Participants attended intensive preschool
classes, and their parents met regularly with teachers. They were then tracked over
forty years, creating a reasonably comprehensive data set on their educational, employ-
ment and criminal outcomes. Recent analysis, whilst downgrading previous measures
of success, still suggest that the project yielded an internal rate of return of 7%-10%
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(Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz 2010). More recently, a range of case
studies by the Education Innovation Laboratory at Harvard University. For example,
the Paper Project in Chicago targets ninth and tenth grade students. The organisers
pay the students for passing their classes. They can earn up to $2,000 per year, with
50% payable upon graduation from high school (Fryer 2010).
Prevention of juvenile crime increases the cost of acquiring criminal skills, and is at
the heart of the arguments put forward by Ballester, Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou 2010.
By disrupting juvenile networks, the authorities are able to increase the cost of acquiring
criminal skills. Youths are forced to learn in isolation, and are unable to learn from
others’ mistakes. They are thus less likely to join criminal organisations, as they will
find inflicting violence to be too costly.
3 A Model of Recruitment to Organised Crime
I present a model of organised crime recruitment. The economic environment, hereafter
referred to as the neighbourhood, consists of two sectors: the primary labour market3
and the gang4. A mass N of heterogeneous youths grow up in the neighbourhood.
After investing in appropriate skills, they decide where to seek employment. Whilst the
primary labour market is passive, the gang acts as a monopsonist employer of criminals
in the neighbourhood. Gang leaders adjust their approach to recruitment in order to
maximise the gang’s profits.
The gang offers a contract schedule comprising of a series of wage and violence in-
tensity pairs (g (s) , V (s)). Recruits to the gang are able to choose any contract, s, they
wish from the available menu. I assume that contracts are binding on both sides, so by
choosing a contract the recruit commits to inflicting a given level of violence in exchange
for the associated wage.
The revenue each gang member, i, generates, be it from drug sales or extortion,
prostitution or people trafficking, depends primarily upon two characteristics: the size
of the gang (total membership, denoted by M ∈ [0, N ]) and the intensity of violence they
inflict, V (si). Each individual’s revenue stream is given by the function
5, r (M,V (si)). I
3This terminology follows Huang, Laing, and Wang 2004, who develop a similar model of predation.
4Whilst the terminology used refers to a street gang, the model presented is equally relevant to
alternative forms of organised crime.
5The black box nature of revenue (as opposed to production) is purely for notational ease. One can
think about it as an indirect revenue function: the one resulting from the optimal allocation of inputs
across the wide range of activities the gang engages in. Kugler et al 2005 consider a more structured
approach, decomposing revenue into the number of crimes committed, and the booty collected from
each crime.
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assume that, at the gang level, Mr (M,V ) is subject to positive but diminishing marginal
returns and constant returns to scale,with r (M, 0) = r (0, V ) = 0 for all M,V ≥ 0. The
constant returns to scale assumption is not necessary, but does make for a simpler
characterisation of the equilibrium and policy effects.
As each gang member receives a wage, g (si), the profit they generate for the gang
is given by:
pi (M, si) ≡ r (M,V (si))− g (si) (1)
The gang chooses its contract schedule to maximise total profits:
Π
(
M, (g (s) , V (s))s≥0
) ≡ME [pi (M, si) |i joins] (2)
The contract schedule is announced prior to any decisions by youths and becomes
common knowledge.
A parameter that proves critical in the analysis to follow is the cross elasticity of the
marginal revenue product of violence with respect to gang size:
η (M,V (si)) ≡ MrMV (M,V (si))
rV (M,V (si))
> −1
η provides a measure of the degree of revenue complementarity between violence and
size for each contract, si. When η is relatively large, a small decrease in one input results
in a relatively large decline in the other’s marginal revenue product. Size and violence
are strong revenue complements. Conversely, when η is small, a decrease in one input
has a relatively minor effect upon the other’s marginal revenue product. The inputs are
therefore weak revenue complements.
Youths vary in their intrinsic criminal ability, denoted by σi and distributed expo-
nentially with parameter λ > 0. Youths simultaneously make two decisions. Firstly,
they choose how much criminal skill to acquire. They also decide which sector to work
in. Acquiring criminal skill is a costly process. However, those with a higher criminal
ability find it easier than those with a lower ability. Denoting the amount of criminal
skill acquired by youth i by ci, the cost of acquiring criminal skill is given by kC
(
ci
σi
)
.
C (·) is a strictly increasing and convex function. k > 0 reflects the fact that policy can
influence how easy it is to acquire criminal skills. An important characteristic of the
criminal skill cost function is its elasticity:
ε (c, σ) ≡
c
σ
C ′′
(
c
σ
)
C ′
(
c
σ
)
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ε plays a role in determining how youths respond to changes in the structure of the
contracts offered by the gang. If it is low, they find it relatively easy to adjust their level
of skill, allowing the gang additional flexibility in responding to policy.
For simplicity, the primary labour market pays an exogenously given flat wage rate,
w ≥ 0. One can consider this wage to be net of any cost of education, as well as
incorporating the probability of unemployment. Should the youth join the gang instead,
they choose a contract, si, from the available menu. However, as discussed in the
introduction, being involved in the gang is a dangerous affair. There is a possibility of
arrest and conviction. Following Becker 1968, arrest occurs with probability p, resulting
in a fine of size f 6 and wages being confiscated7. Moreover, gangs are violent enterprises.
Whilst the gang leaders choose the level of violence the gang is known for, it is the
members who must bear the cost of inflicting that violence. It is at this point that
acquiring criminal skill pays off. By investing effort in learning to be a criminal, youths
become desensitised to violence. So, whilst all gang members suffer disutility from
having to engage in violence, those who have acquired large amounts of criminal capital
suffer less. In particular, each youth suffer disutility −V (si)
ci
. I assume that arrests are
always made after a crime has been committed. Since youths inflict violence during their
crimes, they therefore suffer this disutility irrespective of whether they are subsequently
arrested. The payoff from joining the gang is therefore:
G (ci, si;σi) ≡ (1− p) g (si)− pf − V (si)
ci
− kC
(
ci
σi
)
(3)
In the remainder of the paper, I will distinguish between two extreme types of gang.
A gang is simple if it can only offer a single contract, (g, V ), to all members. In this sense,
it is a single-price monopsonist. All recruits receive the same wage, and inflict identical
levels of violence. At the other end of the spectrum, a gang is separating if it can offer
a full range of contracts, (g (s) , V (s))s≥0, and, in particular, if these contracts satisfy
the youths’ incentive compatibility constraints. As a results, recruits fully separate
according to their abilities; equivalent to second degree price discrimination. Whilst I
am agnostic regarding which type of gang better represents real criminal organisations,
this enables me to demonstrate the robustness of my policy results.
6Whilst f is a constant in this model, the results that follow would apply equally to situations in
which different crimes receive different punishments. In that case, an increase in f would be equivalent
to a situation in which all punishments became more severe, but the gradient of the punishment schedule
remained unchanged.
7This is a simplification. In reality, there is some evidence to suggest that criminal organisations
pay members’ families whilst they are incarcerated. However, as they are unable to take advantage of
other membership benefits, their gang wage does go down.
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4 The Simple Gang
The model with a simple gang yields a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The gang
announces its choices of V and g to maximise profits. Youths then acquire criminal skills
and choose a career, conditional on the announced V and g, as well as their criminal
ability, σ. As per usual, the equilibrium is found by backwards induction.
4.1 Youth Decisions
Taking the announced level of violence and gang wage as given, a youth with criminal
ability σi faces the following utility maximisation problem:
max
j∈{0,1},c>0
{
(1− j)w + j
[
(1− p) g − pf − V
c
]
− kC
(
c
σi
)}
(4)
where j ∈ {0, 1} takes value one when the youth chooses to join the gang and zero
otherwise.
Consider first the choice of criminal skill, conditional upon career choice. If the youth
chooses to join the primary labour market, criminal skill is of no use to them. They
consequently do not incur the cost of acquiring it, and select c∗i = 0. Conversely, if they
decide to join the gang, they choose c∗ (σi, V ) satisfying:
V
c∗ (σi, V )
2 ≡
k
σi
C ′
(
c∗ (σi, V )
σi
)
(5)
The resulting c∗ (σi, V ) is strictly positive, and increasing in both the level of violence
employed by the gang and the criminal ability of the youth. More violence increases the
marginal benefit of acquiring criminal skills, whereas increasing criminal ability reduces
the marginal cost.
Given youths’ choice of criminal skill, it is straightforward to show that the payoff to
joining the gang is strictly increasing in criminal ability. Consider a youth with ability
σ′ > 0. Suppose that they join the gang, and acquire the optimal amount of criminal
skill, c∗ (σ′, V ). Now consider a youth with ability σ′′ > σ′. If this youth joins the gang
and acquires the same amount of criminal skill, then they will enjoy the same wage
and suffer the same disutility from violence. However, since they have higher criminal
ability, the cost of acquiring c∗ (σ′, V ) is lower. They can therefore guarantee themselves
a strictly higher payoff than the youth with criminal ability σ′. Conversely, the payoff
from joining the primary labour market, w, is independent of a youth’s criminal ability.
We can therefore conclude that there exists some σM such that a youth will join the
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gang if and only if σi ≥ σM (V, g). σM is defined by:
G (c∗ (σM , V ) , (g, V ) ;σM) ≡ w (6)
We call the youth with ability σM the marginal youth. Since all youths with ability
above σM join the gang, its size will be given by M = N (1− p) e−λσM . A proportion
e−λσM of the mass N youths join the gang. However, a proportion p are arrested and
convicted, making them unproductive (what Levitt 1996 calls the incapacitation effect).
An increase in the wage offered by the primary labour market increases the oppor-
tunity cost of joining the gang, raising the ability of the marginal youth. Similarly,
increases in the conviction rate, severity of punishment, the degree of violence employed
by the gang, or the cost of acquiring criminal skill reduces the payoff from joining the
gang. Once again, this raises the ability of the marginal youth and, by extension, lowers
the gang’s size. Since the gang is a simple monopsonist, all gang members receive a non-
negative surplus through membership. Moreover, since the cost of violence decreases
with criminal ability, higher ability youths receive a larger surplus than those with lower
ability. Note that this does not imply that organised crime generates a social surplus
for its members. It simply suggests that those who join the gang are better off doing
so in equilibrium. As noted in the introduction, gang activity tends to suppress formal
wages and reduce the incentive to invest in formal human capital. Thus it may be the
case that, were the gang not present, youths could guarantee themselves an even higher
payoff in the primary labour market.
4.2 Gang Leader Decisions
During the exposition of the model, the gang leadership’s profit maximisation problem
was described as a decision regarding the degree of violence it expected gang members to
engage in, V , and a wage rate it offered members, g. As a result of these decisions, some
membership size, M , was induced. An equivalent way to view the problem is to think
about the gang choosing the degree of violence, and then compensating gang members
sufficiently to induce a chosen gang size. The extent of the compensation is derived as
follows. In order to acquire gang size of precisely M , it is necessary that the marginal
youth have criminal ability:
σM =
lnN + ln (1− p)− lnM
λ
(7)
This youth must therefore be indifferent between the gang and the primary labour
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market. In order to ensure this with degree of violence V , the gang must offer a wage:
g (M,V ) ≡ w + pf
1− p +
V
c∗M (1− p)
+
k
1− pC
(
λc∗M
lnN + ln (1− p)− lnM
)
(8)
where c∗M (M,V ) is the criminal skill of the marginal youth, defined implicitly by:
V
c∗M (M,V )
2 ≡
λk
lnN + ln (1− p)− lnMC
′
(
λc∗M (M,V )
lnN + ln (1− p)− lnM
)
(9)
The gang leadership’s profit maximisation problem thus becomes:
(M∗, V ∗) = arg max
M∈[0,N ],V≥0
{Mr (M,V )−Mg (M,V )} (10)
Before continuing to outline the solution to (10), it is expedient to discuss an issue
alluded to in the introduction. When violence increases, the marginal revenue product
of size increases. Gang members face less disruption, a stronger monopoly, and may even
be able to extort higher prices (a revenue effect). Concurrently, however, the marginal
cost of labour also increases. Each member is being forced to engage in more violence,
increasing the loss they suffer as a result. The gang must offer additional compensation
according to (8), in order to prevent those with relatively low criminal ability from opting
to join the primary labour market instead (a cost effect). These two effects counteract
one another, and consequently, the net effect on the marginal profit generate by size is
unclear. Determining which effect dominates is not only helpful when describing the
equilibrium, but proves to have important implications for the impact of policy in this
environment. It is straightforward to show that:
ΠMV =
1
Mc∗M (1− p)
[
η − 1
λσM
1 + εM
2 + εM
]
(11)
where η ≡ η (M,V ) and εM ≡ ε (c∗M , σM). This equation demonstrates the conflict
between the revenue and cost effects. η represents the relative increase in marginal
revenue product of violence, i.e. the revenue effect. The second term in parenthesis in
(11) reflects the relative increase in the wage the gang offers, i.e. the cost effect. As the
degree of violence increases, the amount of compensation required increases. However,
this effect is tempered by the fact that youths invest in more criminal skill.
Which effect dominates depends upon the functional forms of r (·, ·) and C (·) re-
spectively. It is therefore helpful to make one of two assumptions:
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Assumption 1 (Simple Complements) η is sufficiently large to ensure that the rev-
enue effect always dominates the cost effect.
Assumption 2 (Simple Substitutes) η is sufficiently small to ensure that revenue
effect is always dominated by the cost effect.
−1
η
0 M
N
Substitutes
Complements
Figure 1: The range of values over which violence and size are complements or substi-
tutes.
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 1. When η is large relative to M , the
marginal cost of compensating youths for increasing amounts of violence is relatively
small compared to the increase in marginal revenue. As such, Assumption 1 holds.
In particular, if η > 1
λσM
, then the revenue effect always dominates the cost effect,
irrespective of the functional form of C (·). Conversely, if η is small relative to M , the
opposite is true. If η < 1
2λσM
, the relative increase in marginal revenue is insufficient to
compensate for the relative increase in marginal cost, irrespective of the functional form
of C (·). For η in between these two values, the situation is less clear, and the convexity
of the criminal skill cost function becomes important.
We are now in a position to outline the gang leaders’ choices.
Proposition 1 (Profit Maximisation) Suppose that η > 0, and that either Assump-
tion 1 or Assumption 2 holds. Then the gang leadership’s profit maximisation problem
given by (10) has a unique solution, with V ∗ > 0 and M∗ ∈ [0, N ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Requiring that η > 0 serves two purposes and is sufficient to ensure a maximum exists
under both Assumptions 1 and 2. The marginal revenue product of violence declines
as violence increases. However, as the gang requires greater feats of violence from its
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members, each youth optimally invests more heavily in acquiring criminal skills. As a
result, each marginal increase in violence, dV , has a smaller impact upon the cost youths
bear from inflicting violence, dV
c∗ , since c
∗ is larger. Consequently, the gang must increase
its compensation for inflicting violence by smaller amounts as violence increases: the
marginal cost of violence is also decreasing. In order for a maximum to exist, we require
that marginal revenue decline faster than the marginal cost. A sufficient condition for
ensuring this is that η > −1
2
.
Under Assumption 1, η > −1
2
guarantees that a unique maximum exists. Unfortu-
nately, if violence and size are substitutes, the incentive to substitute may be strong
enough to move the gang towards one of the extremes (high violence, tiny membership
or vice versa). To counteract this, we require that a decline in violence reduces the
marginal revenue product of size sufficiently as to admit interior maximum. This, in
turn, requires the slightly stronger condition that η > 0.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are not necessary, but are sufficient to ensure uniqueness of the
equilibrium. To see this, consider the restricted factor demand functions, V˜ (M) and
M˜ (V ). These are derived directly from the first order conditions (below), and give the
gang’s optimal choice of violence and membership size respectively, holding the other
input constant:
rV
(
M, V˜
)
− 1
c∗M (1− p)
≡ 0 (12)
rM
(
M˜, V
)
+Mr
(
M˜, V
)
− g
(
V, M˜
)
− V
λσM˜c
∗
M˜
(1− p) ≡ 0 (13)
Equation 12 gives the optimal choice of violence, given gang size. The gang trades
off the increase in revenue associated with a more violent gang against the increase in
wages it must offer to maintain the indifference of the marginal youth. Equation 13
considers the optimal choice of size. Again, the gang trades off higher revenue against
higher costs. By increasing its size, the gang has more youths to pay. Moreover, it
involves attracting lower ability youths, necessitating an increase in the wage it offers
all its members.
Maintaining the assumption that η > 0, Figure 2 displays the restricted demand
functions for complements and substitutes. In both cases, the gang leaders’ equilib-
rium choices are described by the intersection of the two curves, where their choice of
violence is optimal given their size, and their choice of membership size is optimal
given their level of violence. It is clear from Figure 2, however, that the comparative
statics are different. When membership size and violence are complementary, both re-
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V˜ (M )
M∗
V ∗
V
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M˜ (V )
V˜ (M )
M∗
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Figure 2: Restricted factor demands with complements and substitutes.
stricted demand functions slope upwards8. In this case, an exogenous increase in, say,
the gang’s restricted demand for violence ( V˜ (M) shifts upwards) makes increasing size
more profitable (the revenue effect dominates the cost effect). Consequently, both in-
crease concurrently. In contrast, when size and violence are substitutes, both curves
slope downwards. An exogenous increase in the gang’s restricted demand for violence
makes size less profitable (the cost effect dominates). In this case, the gang optimally
reduces size as violence increases.
5 Policy with a Simple Gang
Each of the policies outlined in the introduction is associated with a parameter in the
model. Specifically:
1. Increasing the severity of punishment increases f .
2. Primary labour market policies increase w.
3. Increasing the arrest or conviction rate increases p.
8The slopes of the restricted demand curves are derived by a simple application of the Implicit
Function Theorem. V˜ (M) is defined by ΠV
(
M, V˜
)
≡ 0. This yields:
V˜M = −ΠMV
ΠV V
Since η > − 12 , ΠV V < 0. Under Assumption 1, ΠMV > 0, so V˜M > 0. Under Assumption 2,
ΠMV < 0, so V˜M < 0. An equivalent argument holds for M˜V , noting that the slope of the curve in
Figure 2 is 1
M˜V
.
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4. Prevention of juvenile crime disrupts the ability of youths to learn criminal skills,
increasing k.
This section analyses how changing these parameters affects both the size of the gang
and the level of violence each member inflicts under the various assumptions already
highlighted. Note that the aim of this section is not to discuss optimal policy. That
would require modelling of the technologies involved in manipulating these parameters,
the associated cost functions, and a more detailed discussion of the exact nature of
the social loss function. Rather, the aim is more modest: to highlight conditions under
which policies designed to combat organised crime may in fact worsen one of its features.
Each of these policies are under active discussion in both academic and policy circles. I
hope to help inform these debates by comparing each in the context of my model. I will
first derive results for a generic policy, φ, before turning attention to the specific policies
above.
5.1 Results for a Generic Policy
We can view the impact of a generic policy by considering its effects on the restricted
demand functions. When a policy is implemented, it can change youth’s incentives in
two ways. Firstly, it may reduce the net benefit they gain from joining the gang. In
order to retain members, this may necessitate the gang raising the wage they offer, or
reducing the cost of violence they inflict upon their membership. Higher wages increase
the marginal cost of size for the gang, as each new youth must be paid more, as shown
in (13). Faced with the increased marginal cost, and no equivalent increase in marginal
revenue, a profit-maximising gang will reduce its restricted demand for members, M˜ as
marginal profit derived from size, ΠM , becomes negative.
Secondly, a policy may affect how youths respond to changes in violence or gang
wages. Some policies increase youths’ sensitivity to violence. Once again, this will force
the gang to increase its wage at every gang size, to retain the services of the marginal
youth. Moreover, any increases in the level of violence the gang enforces will now require
a larger amount of compensation. The marginal cost of violence will also increase. As
there is no equivalent increase in marginal revenue, the marginal profit derived from
violence, ΠV , will also become negative. In this case, the gang will optimally reduce its
restricted demand for violence, V˜ .
This intuition, combined with the first panel of Figure 2, leads us very quickly to our
first result:
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Proposition 2 (Policy with Simple Complements) Suppose that η > 0 and that
Assumption 1 holds. Then any policy which reduces either ΠM or ΠV and does not
increase the other, reduces both the amount of violence the gang employs, and the number
of members that the gang chooses to recruit.
V
M
V˜
M˜
M∗
V ∗
V˜ ′
M˜ ′
M∗′
V ∗′
Figure 3: Policy effects with complements.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. If ΠM declines, then the restricted demand for size
shifts inwards. Similarly, if ΠV declines, then the restricted demand for violence shifts
inwards. Since both curves are upward sloping, any inward shift leads, unambiguously,
to a fall in both size and violence. Now, any fall in say, size, reduces the marginal revenue
product of violence (the revenue effect). However, since fewer gang members need to be
compensated for changes in violence, the marginal cost of violence also falls (the cost
effect). If violence and size are complements, the fall in marginal revenue exceeds the
fall in marginal cost, and the gang reduces its optimal level of violence. In turn, this
causes a further reduction in size. These endogenous effects reinforce the decline in both
size and violence, leading to the result. We can therefore conclude that, if membership
size and violence are sufficiently strong revenue complements, any policy will be effective
in reducing the loss society suffers at the hands of the gang. As each policy leads to
a reduction in both inputs, the resulting profit-maximising combination unambiguously
results in a smaller social loss.
Unfortunately, the case with substitutes is not so clear cut, as shown in Figure 4.
In contrast to complements, reductions in size cause the gang to substitute towards
violence, and vice versa. As with complements, a fall in say, size, reduces both the
marginal revenue product and the marginal cost of violence. Now, however, the decline
in marginal cost exceeds the decline in marginal revenue, causing an endogenous increase
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Figure 4: Policy effects with substitutes.
in the restricted demand for violence. Similarly, a decline in violence makes size more
profitable, causing an endogenous increase in the restricted demand for size. Conse-
quently, if one of these effects were to offset the initial impact of the policy, we could
have a situation in which either membership size or violence increases (but, fortunately,
not both). It may even be possible that a policy designed to reduce the social loss from
organised crime may actually increase it. The term which determines these effects is
ΠMφ
ΠV φ
, as the following proposition makes clear:
Proposition 3 (Policy with Simple Substitutes) Suppose that η > 0 and that As-
sumption 2 holds. Consider any policy which reduces either ΠM or ΠV and does not
increase the other:
1. If
ΠMφ
ΠV φ
<
∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ then the policy reduces violence, but increases size.
2. If
ΠMφ
ΠV φ
∈
[∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ , 1|M˜V |
]
then the policy reduces both size and violence.
3. If
ΠMφ
ΠV φ
> 1|M˜V | then the policy reduces size, but increases violence.
Each case is outlined in Figure 4. The fact that η > 0 ensures that all three scenarios
are feasible, i.e. that
∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ < 1|M˜V | . The immediate effect of the policy is to (weakly)
reduce the restricted demand for each input. Which scenario then occurs depends,
crucially, upon the size of each shift. In case one, the restricted demand for violence
shifts down by more than the restricted demand for size. V˜ is defined by ΠV = 0. Fixing
size, we have that the vertical shift, V˜φ, is given by:
ΠV V V˜φ + ΠV φ = 0
⇐⇒ V˜φ = −ΠV φ
ΠV V
(14)
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Similarly, M˜ is defined by ΠM = 0. Fixing size again, and considering the vertical
shift, we have that:
ΠVMVφ + ΠMφ = 0
⇐⇒ Vφ = −ΠMφ
ΠMV
(15)
So if the restricted demand for violence shifts downwards by more than the restricted
demand for size:
ΠV φ
ΠV V
>
ΠMφ
ΠMV
⇐⇒
∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ > ΠMφ
ΠV φ
(16)
Intuitively, the marginal profit accruing to violence declines by much more than the
marginal profit accruing to size. As such, the restricted demand for violence decreases
dramatically. This fall in violence decreases both the marginal revenue and marginal
cost of size. However, since the two inputs are substitutes, marginal cost reduces more,
offsetting the initial fall in marginal profit: the cost effect dominates the revenue effect.
In case one, the fall in violence is so large that the marginal profit accruing to size
actually becomes positive, creating an incentive for the gang to become larger.
Identical arguments can be made for the remaining two cases. In case two, the
horizontal shift of the restricted demand for violence must exceed the horizontal shift in
the restricted demand for size, and vice versa for the vertical shift. Neither input suffers
a particularly large fall in marginal profit, and the substitution effects are not sufficient
to counteract the initial declines in demand. In case three, the horizontal shift of the
restricted demand for size must exceed the equivalent shift for violence. This time, the
marginal profit accruing to size falls dramatically, creating a strong incentive for the
gang to substitute away from size, towards violence.
The cross-elasticity, η, plays a large role in determining which case arises, as it is the
key parameter in describing how strong the revenue effect is. In particular, when η is
large,
∣∣∣M˜V ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ both decrease. The two inputs are strong revenue complements.
As such, case two becomes more prominent, as the size of the interval
[∣∣∣V˜M ∣∣∣ , 1|M˜V |
]
grows. Conversely, if η is small, the revenue effect is very weak and size and violence are
strong substitutes. It thus becomes increasingly likely that one of the two extreme cases
occurs. For each policy, φ, we can therefore define ηφV and η
φ
M such that if η
φ
V > η
φ
M and
η < ηφV then we are in case one. If η > max{ηφV , ηφM} then we are in case two. Finally, if
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ηφM > η
φ
V and η < η
φ
M then we are in case three.
5.2 Results for Specific Policies
The direct effect of each of class of policy is to reduce the marginal profit of either
violence, size or both inputs. As such, under Assumption 1, Proposition 2 holds, and
both violence and size are unequivocally diminished. The loss society suffers as a result
of the gang will always decline. For each policy, we will therefore focus on what happens
under Assumption 2. With substitutes, a fall in demand for one input causes an increase
in demand for the other, counteracting the immediate effects of the policy. The social
loss the gang inflicts may therefore increase.
5.2.1 Severity of Punishment (f)
When violence and size are substitutes, the effects of an increase in the severity of pun-
ishment are unambiguous. When severity increases, the marginal cost of size increases
(from (13)). Recruits require a greater degree of compensation for the possibility of
being punished, increasing the wage the gang offers for any given gang size. As a result,
the gang’s restricted demand for members falls (ΠMf < 0). However, if they still decide
to join the gang, greater severity of punishment has no impact upon youths’ willingness
to acquire criminal skills (given by (5)). In particular, for each given gang size, the crim-
inal skills acquired by the marginal youth remain unchanged. Consequently, there is no
exogenous change in the gang’s marginal cost of violence. By (12), the gang’s restricted
demand for violence remains unchanged (ΠV f = 0). We are firmly in case three:
Corollary 1 Suppose that η > 0 and that Assumption 2 holds. Then any increase in
the severity of punishment will result in fewer, more violent gang members.
If society suffers sufficiently from increases in the intensity of violence that the gang
chooses to inflict, then this policy could lead to an increase in the social loss the gang
creates.
5.2.2 Primary Labour Market Policies (w)
The effect of an increase in the market wage is similar to that of an increase in the severity
of punishment. The opportunity cost of joining the gang is increased. The gang must
offer higher wages at every gang size, increasing the marginal cost of size. Consequently,
by (13), the marginal cost of size exceeds the marginal revenue it generates, and the
restricted demand for membership size declines (ΠMw < 0). Upon deciding to join the
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gang, youths’ incentives to acquire criminal skill are unaffected by the increase in w.
As such, for each given size, the marginal cost to the gang of increasing violence is
unchanged (ΠV w = 0). As a result, by (12), the restricted demand for violence once
again remains the same:
Corollary 2 Suppose that η > 0 and that Assumption 2 holds. Then any improvement
in the primary labour market will result in fewer, more violent gang members.
Again, if society is particularly sensitive to changes in the intensity of violence,
relative to changes in size, labour market policies could actually increase the social cost
of the gang.
5.2.3 Arrest and Conviction Rate (p)
The arrest and conviction rate has the most complex effect of any of the policies con-
sidered. An increase in the probability of conviction reduces the restricted demand for
membership size for three reasons. For a given level of violence, an increase in p increases
the wage the gang must offer to maintain its membership. Not only does it become more
likely that gang members will be punished (increasing pf), but the probability that they
will be deprived of their wages also rises. Youths discount for this in (8), and conse-
quently require even more pay in order to join. These two outcomes constitute Levitt’s
deterence effect (1996). Moreover, maintaining the same size of gang involves recruiting
lower ability members, as more members are locked away (and are thus unproductive).
Since lower ability individuals are more sensitive to violence, a third increase in the wage
the gang offers is required. This is Levitt’s incapacitation effect. Combined, these three
wage increases raise the marginal cost of size in (13). As marginal revenue is thus far
unaffected, the restricted demand for size declines (ΠMp < 0).
In contrast to the previous two policies, increasing the probability of conviction
also reduces the restricted demand for violence. For given gang size, the ability of the
marginal youth is lower. Lower ability youths find it more costly to invest in criminal
skills. The marginal youth is thus relatively sensitive to changes in violence (c∗M falls
in (9)). Any increase in violence requires a greater increase in the gang wage, in order
to retain its membership. In addition, youths incur the cost of violence irrespective of
whether they are arrested or not. Since there is a greater chance that they will not
receive their wages, they require proportionally more compensation should the amount
of violence they inflict increase. Both these effects increase the marginal cost of violence
in (12), reducing the restricted demand for violence (ΠV p < 0).
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In sum, both the restricted demand curves shift inward. Depending upon the size of
the shifts, any of the cases outlined in Proposition 3 appear feasible. This turns out not
to be the case, as we have the following result:
Corollary 3 Suppose that η > 0 and that Assumption 2 holds. Then any improvement
in the arrest and conviction rate may result in:
1. Fewer, more violent gang members; or
2. fewer, less violent gang members.
It can never be the case that more, less violent gang members result.
The result hinges upon the revenue effect. If η is large, then membership size and
violence are relatively weak profit substitutes. As such, when the restricted demand for
violence and size decline, the incentive to substitute is insufficient to cause the gang
to increase their demand for either input; the endogenous effects are dominated by the
direct effects. Conversely, if η is low, there is a strong incentive to substitute and the gang
could potentially increase demand for either input. It can be shown that ηpV > 0 > η
p
M so
that we can immediately rule out the possibility that the gang increases its membership.
The increase in the marginal cost of size always dominates the increase in marginal
revenue, even taking endogenous effects into account.
It is, however, possible that the level of violence that gang members inflict increases.
Nevertheless, if the gang size is either very large or very small, violence will certainly
decline. If it is small, then the ability of the marginal youth is high. When the arrest
and conviction rate is increased, the marginal cost of size remains relatively unchanged.
Wages are very close to w+pf
1−p , as the marginal youth does not require a lot of compen-
sation for the violence they inflict. As a result, since the marginal revenue product of
size is large for a small gang, gang size also remains relatively stable. This provides a
relatively weak incentive to substitute. The increase in the marginal revenue product
of violence is insufficient to counteract the exogenous fall in the restricted demand for
violence.
When gang size is very large, the ability of the marginal youth is low. They therefore
require a large amount of compensation for the violence the gang requires them to inflict.
Any fall in the restricted demand for size will thus decrease the marginal cost of size
substantially. Once again, the result is that the gang’s size does not decline very much.
The incentive to substitute is dominated by the decline in the restricted demand for
violence.
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Relative to the previous two policies, increasing the arrest and conviction rate is
relatively successful at reducing the loss society suffers. Whilst it may be the case that
violence increases, this only happens when size and violence are extremely strong profit
substitutes. Otherwise, even under Assumption 2, both size and violence decline, leading
to an unambiguous fall in the social loss.
5.2.4 Prevention of Juvenile Crime (k)
As with the conviction rate, increasing the effort to prevent juvenile crime impacts upon
both the restricted demand for size, and the restricted demand for violence. Youths
find it more difficult to acquire criminal skills (from (5)). They suffer more from the
violence the gang requires them to inflict. Youths therefore require a larger wage for each
level of violence in order to retain their membership. Moreover, the marginal youth is
disproportionately affected by the policy. As the youth with the lowest ability, they are
most sensitive to changes to the cost of acquiring criminal skills (see (9)). Any attempt
by the gang to increase its membership therefore require a larger increase in the wage
than before the introduction of the policy. Both the higher wage and the larger wage
increase required to recruit more members increase the marginal cost of size for the gang
(in (13)), reducing its restricted demand (ΠMk < 0).
Since all youths acquire fewer criminal skills, the marginal cost of violence increases
as well. In particular, for each gang size, increasing violence whilst retaining the marginal
youth is more expensive. With fewer criminal skills, they are more sensitive to violence,
and consequently require a greater increase in their wage to compensate them for the
additional violence the gang wishes them to inflict. As the marginal revenue product
of violence is unaffected by the policy, the increased marginal cost induces the gang to
reduce its restricted demand for violence as well (ΠV k < 0).
Once more, it appears that all three cases in Proposition 3 are feasible. Both re-
stricted demand curves have shifted inwards. Again, this turns out to be incorrect:
Corollary 4 Suppose that η > 0 and that Assumption 2 holds. Then any improvement
in the prevention of juvenile crime may result in:
1. Fewer, more violent gang members; or
2. fewer, less violent gang members.
It can never be the case that more, less violent gang members result.
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Once again, it is straightforward to show that ηkV > 0 > η
k
M , so the gang never
increases its size. It is possible that its members will become more violent. We can rule
out increases in violence, however, for very large or very small gangs. In both cases, the
improvement in the prevention of juvenile crime will result in relatively small changes
in gang size, creating a very weak incentive to substitute towards violence.
Prevention of juvenile crime also proves to be relatively effective at reducing the
loss society suffers. Once again, size and violence need to be extremely weak revenue
complements to cause an increase in gang violence. It is quite possible that both will
decline as a result of the policy, reducing the social cost of the gang.
6 The Separating Gang
The analysis performed in the previous few sections was done under the assumption
that the gang was unable to discriminate between individuals. It offered one wage
rate, and one level of violence. I now relax that assumption, and instead ask how the
various policies perform when the gang is free to implement any incentive compatible
wage scheme and associated violence schedule. I consider a symmetric separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium focusing, of course, on direct mechanisms. As before, I proceed by
backwards induction.
6.1 Youth Decisions
In the model with a separating gang, a youth with criminal ability σi faces the following
utility maximisation problem:
max
j∈{0,1},c≥0,s≥0
{
(1− j)w + j
[
(1− p) g (s)− pf − V (s)
c
]
− kC
(
c
σi
)}
(17)
The youth’s choice of criminal skill and career are identical to before. If they join
the gang, they will acquire criminal skills c∗ (s∗i ;σi) satisfying:
V (s∗i )
c∗ (s∗i ;σi)
2 ≡
k
σi
C ′
(
c∗ (s∗i ;σi)
σi
)
(18)
otherwise, they will not invest anything. Moreover, they will join the gang if:
G (c∗i , s
∗
i ;σi) ≥ w (19)
If a youth of ability σi joins the gang, it is straightforward to show that all youths with
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ability σ > σi also join the gang. Suppose that the youth with ability σi chooses contract
s∗i . If they join, it must be the case that G (c
∗
i , s
∗
i ;σi) > w. Now, any youth choosing s∗i
is offered (g (s∗i ) , V (s
∗
i )). As discussed in Section 4.1, for given g and V , a youth’s payoff
is increasing in σ. So any youth with ability greater than σi can guarantee themselves
a payoff greater than w by joining the gang and choosing s∗i . The payoff from joining
the gang must once again be strictly increasing in ability. Consequently, there exists a
marginal youth, who has the lowest ability of any gang member, σM ≥ 0.
Finally, each youth who decides to join the gang chooses a contract to maximise the
payoff they receive from their membership:
(1− p) ∂g
∂s
(s∗ (σi)) ≡ 1
c∗ (σi, s∗i )
∂V
∂s
(s∗ (σi)) (20)
A youth will therefore truthfully reveal their ability if and only if σi satisfies the
above equation, i.e. s∗ (σi) = σi.
6.2 Gang Leader Decisions
The gang leaders’ decisions are significantly more complicated. They must now choose
a profit-maximising contract schedule, subject to its being implementable. The form of
an implementable contract schedule is given by the following:
Proposition 4 (Implementable Contracts) A contract schedule, {(g (s) , V (s))}s≥0,
is implementable if and only if it is of the form:
g (s) =
w + pf
1− p +
V (s)
c∗ (1− p) +
k
1− pC
(
c∗
s
)
+
1
1− p
∫ s
t=σM
V (t)
tc∗
dt (21)
Proof. See Appendix B.
This relationship between wages and violence bears a tremendous similarity to that
of the marginal youth in a simple gang, given by (8). The first three terms simply state
that each youth must be compensated for the expected costs incurred by joining the
gang. The difference arises in the final term of (21), which constitutes informational
rent.
An example of an implementable contract schedule is shown in Figure 5, displaying
indifference curves for two youths. Higher ability youths are less sensitive to violence.
As such, less compensation is required when violence is increased in order to maintain
indifference: their indifference curves are steeper. The contract schedule is designed so
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σ1 > σ0
g0
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V1
Figure 5: An example of an implementable contract.
that each youth weakly prefers the contract designed for their ability to all others. For
example, the youth with ability σ1 > σ0 prefers (g1, V1) to (g0, V0).
An important feature of an implementable contract is made clear by Figure 5: wages
and violence must both be increasing in ability. To see this, note that for a youth
with ability σ1 to prefer a bundle (g1, V1) to (g0, V0) it must lie to the south-east of the
σ1-indifference curve passing through (g0, V0). Similarly, for a youth with ability σ0 to
prefer (g0, V0) over (g1, V1), (g1, V1) must lie to the north-west of the σ0-indifference curve
passing through (g0, V0). Only contracts in the shaded region satisfy both properties, so
g and V must both be increasing in ability.
Restricting attention to implementable contracts, we now turn our attention to the
gang’s profit maximisation decision. Since the gang’s choice of violence uniquely deter-
mines the wage it must pay to its members, it is sufficient once again to think of the
gang as maximising profits with respect to {V (s)}s≥0 and M . Its optimal choice of g (s)
will then be given by (21). In other words, the gang solves:
(
(V ∗ (s))s≥0 ,M
∗) = arg max
(V (s))s≥0,M≥0
{
N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM
pi (s,M)λe−λsds
}
(22)
subject to : (21)
The solution is described in two stages. Firstly, for each ability and each gang size,
I describe the optimal choice of violence. This provides a restricted violence schedule,
dependent upon the gang’s membership size
(
V˜ (s,M)
)
s≥0
. Then, incorporating this
restricted violence schedule into (22), the gang chooses membership size to maximise its
profits. Without further ado:
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Proposition 5 (Restricted Violence Schedule) Suppose that, for each σ and each
M , η (M, ·) > 1
2
and 1+
c∗
σ
C′′′( c
∗
σ )
C′′( c∗σ )
> ε
(
c∗
σ
)
. Then there exists a unique violence schedule,(
V˜ (s,M)
)
s≥0
that maximises profits.
Proof. See Appendix C.
For each gang size and each σ ≥ σM , the gang selects V˜ (σ) to satisfy:
rV
(
M, V˜ (σ)
)
− 1
c∗ (1− p) −
1
c∗ (1− p)
1 + ε (c∗, σ)
λσ (2 + ε (c∗, σ))
≡ 0 (23)
where c∗ = c∗ (σ;σ). This expression is very similar to (12). The marginal benefit
to the gang of increasing a member’s violence comes in the form of additional revenue
they will be able to generate. The marginal cost comprises two elements. Firstly, it
is necessary to compensate the individual for the disutility they suffer from inflicting
more violence. The second element of the marginal cost represents the need to increase
the informational rent paid to members. Increasing violence for a youth with ability σ
increases the informational rent to all members with ability greater than σ. The rent paid
to those with lower ability is unaffected (see (21)). As increasing size involves attracting
lower ability members to the gang, the increase in informational rent is unaffected by
the size of the gang.
Substituting the restricted violence schedule into (22), we are now in a position to
calculate the gang’s optimal size.
Proposition 6 (Profit Maximisation with Separation) Suppose that Proposition
5 is satisfied, and that rMM > 0, rMMV < 0, rMV rMV V < 0 and
∂3pi
∂V 2∂σ
< 0. Then there
exists a unique gang size, 0 < M∗ < N , that maximises profits.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Given a violence schedule, the gang choose a membership size to satisfy:
r
(
M˜, V (σM˜)
)
− g (σM˜) +N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM˜
rM
(
M˜, V (s)
)
λe−λsds− V (σM˜)
λσM˜c
∗
M˜
(1− p) ≡ 0
(24)
where c∗M = c
∗ (σM , σM).When the gang increases its size, its new members generate
revenue equal to r
(
V (σM˜) , M˜
)
. The marginal cost has several components. First, each
new member must be paid. Their wage is given by (21), but does not need to incorporate
any informational rent since a youth would never choose to overperform during initiation.
Secondly, since the aggregate revenue function has diminishing marginal returns, it must
be the case that an increase in size reduces the revenue each inframarginal member is
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able to generate. Finally, the gang must increase the wages paid to all youths who were
already planning to join the gang. Otherwise, there would exist a higher ability youth
who would choose to send signal σM to acquire the low wage-low violence contract.
7 Policy with a Separating Gang
In Section 5, the extent to which violence and membership size were revenue comple-
ments was critical in determining the effects of policy. When a policy reduced demand
for, say, size, the marginal revenue product and marginal cost of violence fell. With
fewer members, the gang was less able to convert violence into higher revenue. However,
the gang needed to compensate fewer members for the violence they were required to
inflict. When size and violence were strong revenue complements (the revenue effect was
large), the fall in the marginal revenue product of violence exceeded the fall in marginal
cost. The demand for violence fell. Conversely, if they were weak revenue complements,
the opposite was true.
A similar intuition holds when the gang is capable of separating out recruits. When
gang size increases, there are two opposing effects on the marginal revenue product of
violence. Firstly, as there are more members inflicting violence, aggregate revenue from
violence increases, as per the assumption in Section 2. The increased membership will
also impact upon the personal marginal revenue products of violence of those already
in the gang. Gang members may be able to take advantage of network externalities
and returns to scale, increasing their marginal revenue products of violence (Network
Effects). Conversely, Congestion Effects may reduce the marginal revenue product, as
more individuals are attempting to extract rents from the neighbourhood. So long as the
aggregate effect dominates the individual ones, we are consistent with the model of the
previous section (η (M,V (si)) > −1). However, the degree of revenue complementarity
will be strongly affected by whether the network or congestion effects dominate at the
individual level. This leads us to make one of two assumptions:
Assumption 3 (Separating Complements) Network effects dominate congestion ef-
fects, so that an individual gang member’s marginal revenue product of violence is strictly
increasing in the gang’s size: η (M,V (si)) > 0.
Assumption 4 (Separating Substitutes) Network effects are dominated by conges-
tion effects, so that an individual gang member’s marginal revenue product of violence
is strictly decreasing in the gang’s size: −1 < η (M,V (si)) < 0.
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The consequences of these assumptions are shown in Figure 6. Clearly, if Assump-
tion 3 holds, then size and violence are very strong revenue complements. When the
gang’s membership increases, additional members increase the amount of violence the
gang is able to bring to bear, and enable existing members to take advantage of network
externalities. This makes violence more profitable for each member. Their individual
restricted demand for violence is increasing in gang size. Similarly, the marginal revenue
product of size is increasing in the restricted demand for violence of each individual. If
Assumption 4 holds, on the other hand, size and violence are weak revenue complements.
Whilst the additional members enable the gang to inflict more violence, the neighbour-
hood becomes satiated and existing gang members see their personal returns to violence
fall. The individual restricted demand for violence is decreasing in gang size. Moreover,
an increase in the level of violence each individual inflicts reduces the marginal revenue
product of size.
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Figure 6: Restricted factor demands with separation and complements or substitutes.
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7.1 Results for a Generic Policy
The impact of a generic policy, φ, is similar to that discussed in Section 5. Each policy
still acts to increase the gang’s marginal cost of membership size and (in certain cases)
violence. For a given violence schedule, policies reduce the surplus youths receive from
joining the gang. As such, any increase in membership necessitates paying a higher wage
than before. This is compounded by the need to maintain truthful revelation. If the
gang offers higher wages to new (low ability) members, and do not ask them to inflict
more violence, then there will exist a higher ability youth who will strictly prefer to
accept the contract offered to the new members. The gang must therefore increase the
informational rent paid to all its members. Given this increase in marginal cost, the
gang will optimally choose to reduce its size.
Policy may also affect youths’ response to changes in violence. In contrast to the
previous model, however, each youth inflicts different levels of violence, so the gang
adjusts its violence schedule on a youth-by-youth basis. Assuming that a policy affects
every youth in a similar way, each youth will require an increase in their wages to
compensate them for increases in the level of violence they are required to inflict. For
given gang size, the marginal revenue product of violence is unaffected. So, once again,
the gang will optimally reduce the amounts of violence it requires its members to inflict.
The overall effect also depends upon the strength of revenue complementarity be-
tween membership size and violence. If they are strong complements, we have the
following result, equivalent to Proposition 2 in Section 5:
Proposition 7 (Policy with Separating Complements) Suppose the conditions given
in Proposition 6 and Assumption 3 hold. Then any policy which reduces either piV or
ΠM and does not increase the other reduces both the amount of violence each member of
the gang inflicts and the number of members the gang chooses to recruit.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 7. Consider a policy that reduces the gang’s
size by increasing the marginal cost of size. Under Assumption 3, gang members are
no longer able to take advantage of economies that were previously available to them.
As a result, the marginal revenue product of violence declines for each gang member.
The marginal cost of violence is unaffected by changes in size. Consequently, piV < 0 for
every gang member, and the gang chooses to reduce the amount of violence it requires
its members to inflict.
Now consider a policy that reduces the amount of violence the gang’s members
inflict for each M . Each individual’s restricted demand for violence shifts down. By the
Envelope Theorem, the only effect on the marginal profitability of size manifests itself
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in a decline of the individual marginal revenue products of size of the inframarginal
recruits. The MRP curve also shifts down. As a result, ΠM < 0 and the gang chooses
to reduce its size.
These two endogenous effects reinforce declines in both gang size and the amount of
violence each member inflicts, giving rise to the result in Proposition 7. If Assumption 3
is satisfied, just as before, any policy will be effective at reducing the loss society suffers
at the hands of the gang.
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Figure 7: Policy effects with separation and complements.
If increases in membership cause congestion, violence and membership are relatively
weak revenue complements. As with the simple gang environment, this makes the policy
effects much more difficult to predict, shown in Figure 8. Consider a policy that increases
the marginal cost of size. The gang optimally reduces the number of youths it recruits,
increasing the marginal revenue product of violence for each gang member. With fewer
members, each individual is able to extract greater rents from the neighbourhood by
employing violence. Thus reducing size causes an endogenous increase in violence.
Similarly, any policy which reduces individual’s restricted demand for violence in-
creases the marginal revenue product of size. With the neighbourhood less satiated with
violence, there are greater opportunities for new members to generate revenue. The
gang will opt to endogenously increase its membership.
When a policy is implemented that directly reduces both size and violence, these
endogenous effects counteract the initial fall in both inputs. The final outcome is not
immediately clear, as formalised in the following proposition, equivalent to Proposition
3 in Section 5:
Proposition 8 (Policy with Separation and Substitutes) Suppose the conditions
given in Proposition 6 and Assumption 4 hold. Consider any policy which reduces either
piV or ΠM and does not increase the other:
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1. If ΠMφ < M
∫∞
s=σM
piV φ |VM |λe−λ(s−σM )ds then the policy reduces the amount of
violence each member of the gang inflicts, but increases size.
2. If ΠMφ > M
∫∞
s=σM
piV φ |VM |λe−λ(s−σM )ds then the policy reduces the size of the
gang, and:
(a) Individual gang members for which
piV φ
rMV
> |Mφ| inflict less violence.
(b) Individual gang members for which
piV φ
rMV
< |Mφ| inflict more violence.
Each case is illustrated in Figure 8. The direct effects of the policy are both a
decline in the restricted demand for violence for each individual, and an increase in the
marginal cost of size. The decline in violence stimulates an increase in the marginal
revenue product of violence, and it is this (relative to the change in marginal cost) that
leads to the different outcomes. In case 1, the marginal revenue product endogenously
increases by more than the increase in marginal cost. The gang optimally increases
its size. However, this creates additional congestion. The marginal revenue product
of violence declines for each individual, further reducing the amount of violence they
employ.
In case two, the increase in the marginal revenue product of size is insufficient to
cause the gang to recruit more members. Congestion is reduced, increasing the marginal
revenue product of violence for each individual. Individuals whose marginal cost of
violence was strongly affected by the policy, or who have are relatively unaffected by
congestion optimally reduce the extent of their violence (Case 2(a)). Otherwise, they
increase it (Case 2(b)).
The conditions given in Proposition 8 are equivalent to those seen before. Size is
defined by ΠM = 0. If, after a policy was enforced, size were to remain unchanged, we
would have:
ΠMφ +M
∫ ∞
s=σM
piV φVMλe
−λ(s−σM )ds = 0 (25)
The direct decline in the marginal profitability of size resulting from the policy would
be exactly offset by the increase in marginal profitability resulting from a fall in vio-
lence. The condition in case one states that there is an overal increase in the marginal
profitability of size, resulting in a net increase in members. In case two, the opposite is
true 9.
As different youths engage in different levels of violence, the effect of policy on
violence is significantly more complex than in Proposition 3. In particular, there is no
9Note that, if every gang member inflicts the same amount of violence, (25) becomes ΠMφ −
MpiV φ |VM | = 0 ⇐⇒ |VM | = ΠMφMpiV φ =
ΠMφ
ΠV φ
, exactly as before.
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Case 2(b): More violent members in a smaller gang
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Figure 8: Policy effects with separation and substitutes.
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such thing as M˜V . Instead, consider the effect on the marginal profitability of violence
of policy for a given level of violence:
piV φ + rMVMφ (26)
When a policy is implemented, its direct effect may incorporate an immediate decline
in the profitability of violence. However, if size also declines, the neighbourhood becomes
less congested. This enables each youth to generate more revenue through violence. The
marginal cost of each youth increasing violence is unaffected by size, as changes in
violence only affect the informational rents of those youths with higher ability. If the
decline in gang size is sufficiently large, the increase in the marginal revenue product
of violence may dominate the fall in profitability caused by the policy. In this case,
piV φ + rMVMφ > 0 and the gang optimally increases the amount of violence the youth is
required to inflict. The conditions given in Proposition 8 are thus precisely those that
dictate whether the marginal profitability of violence increases or decline.
7.2 Results for Specific Policies
When the gang can discriminate between its members, and Assumption 3 holds, the
effects of any of the policies I consider are unambiguous. Since all policies’ direct effects
include reducing the marginal profit generated by membership size, size declines. This
causes a reduction in the marginal revenue product of violence for all members, in turn
reducing violence. Proposition 7 holds. Under Assumption 4, the results are less clear,
and are outlined below.
7.2.1 Severity of Punishment (f)
Increasing the severity of punishment only affects the restricted demand for size. It
increases the expected cost of joining the gang. However, once a youth has decided to
join, it leaves their incentive to acquire criminal skills (and hence their sensitivity to
violence) unaltered. In order to maintain the size of its membership, the gang must
increase the wages it pays to all of its members for a given violence schedule (see (21)).
If it were to attempt to attract new members, it would need to offer them a higher wage
as well. The marginal cost of size has increased, as shown in (24). Since the violence
schedule is as yet unaffected, the marginal revenue product of size remains constant,
leading to a fall in the marginal profitability of size, ΠM < 0. The gang chooses to
reduce its membership. We are in case 2(b):
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Corollary 5 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 6 and Assumption 4 hold.
Then any increase in the severity of punishment will result in fewer gang members, but
each member will increase the amount of violence they inflict.
As in Section 5, if society is relatively sensitive to increases in gang violence, intro-
ducing more severe punishment across the board could lead to a increase in the damage
the gang inflicts on society. Whilst membership does decline, reducing the loss, each
remaining member may become increasingly violent. This can more than offsets these
gains.
7.2.2 Primary Labour Market Policies (w)
The effect of improvement in the primary labour market is, once again, identical to an
increase in the severity of punishment. As the opportunity cost of joining the gang
increases, the gang must offer the marginal youth a higher wage, given the violence
schedule. This increases the marginal cost of size in (24), whilst having no effect upon
its marginal revenue product. The marginal profitability of size declines, and the gang
optimally reduces its size:
Corollary 6 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 6 and Assumption 4 hold.
Then any improvement in the primary labour market will result in fewer gang members,
but each member will increase the amount of violence they inflict.
Unsurprisingly, even under this more complicated wage setting, improvements in the
primary labour market can also yield greater social losses from the gang.
7.2.3 Arrest and Conviction Rate (p)
When there is an increase in the arrest and conviction rate, the marginal cost of size
increases. In a similar manner to the previous two policies, the expected cost of joining
the gang has increased, as it is more likely that an individual will be punished (pf is
higher in (21)). Furthermore, if youths are caught, their wages are witheld. When
deciding upon whether to join the gang, they discount their wages for this possibility,
and consequently require higher wages to encourage them into a criminal career. With
no equivalent increase in the marginal revenue product, the marginal profitability of size
declines in (24), and the gang chooses to reduce its size.
The marginal cost of violence also increases for every youth. Gang members are
only arrested after committing crime. However, it is during the commission of crime
that they inflict violence. Irrespective of whether they are caught, they therefore incur
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the cost of violence. The compensation they receive for doing so, on the other hand,
are conditional on their evading arrest. Consequently, when the arrest rate increases,
and gang members discount their wage further, any increase in violence requires a more
substantial increases in pay. With no change in the marginal revenue product of violence,
this causes the gang to reduce the levels of violence it requires its members to inflict.
Combined, these two effects give rise to the following result, equivalent to Lemma 3:
Corollary 7 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 6 and Assumption 4 hold.
Then any improvement in the arrest and conviction rate may result in:
1. More, less violent gang members;
2. Fewer gang members, some of whom may become more violent, others of whom
may become less violent.
Unlike in the case of the simple gang, we are unable to rule out the possibility that
the gang increases its size. Sufficed to say that, in comparison to increasing the severity
of punishment or the primary labour market wage, improvements in the arrest and
conviction rate are more likely to result in a reduction in the social loss caused by the
gang’s activities.
7.2.4 Prevention of Juvenile Crime (k)
Increases in the prevention of juvenile crime reduces the restricted demand for size.
The cost of acquiring criminal skills increases. For a given violence schedule, every
prospective member of the gang invest less, and consequently suffers a greater disutility
from the violence they are forced to inflict. The marginal youth is particularly affected.
As the youth with the lowest intrinsic ability, they are more sensitive to changes in the
cost of acquiring criminal skills, and consequently reduce their skills dramatically. The
cost of retaining their membership increases. They require higher wages. This leads
to increases in the informational rent paid to all inframarginal members. The marginal
cost of size increases. As, given the violence schedule, there is no equivalent increase in
the marginal revenue product of size, the marginal profit associated with size declines
(ΠM < 0). The gang optimally reduces the number of members it recruits.
Concurrently, the policy also reduces the restricted demand for violence. As each
youth incurs a higher cost of acquiring criminal skills, they reduce their investment. In
turn, this causes them suffer a greater disutility from the violence they are required to
inflict. Moreover, as they have lower levels of criminal skill, they also become more sensi-
tive to changes in violence. Each youth therefore requires a greater level of compensation
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for any changes in the level of violence they are required to inflict. The marginal cost of
violence increases for every gang member. For a given gang size, there is no change in
the marginal revenue product of violence. The marginal profitability of violence declines
for all members (piV < 0). The gang reduces every element of its violence schedule.
We have the following result:
Corollary 8 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 6 and Assumption 4 hold.
Then any improvement in the prevention of juvenile crime may result in:
1. More, less violent gang members;
2. Fewer gang members, some of whom may become more violent, others of whom
may become less violent.
Again, it is not possible to rule out the gang increasing its membership. In spite of
this, increasing efforts to prevent juvenile crime could yield situations in which both the
gang’s size and the amount of violence its members inflict decline.
8 Conclusions
Over recent years, numerous policies have been put forward to combat the social loss
associated with crime. These policies aim to decrease individuals’ incentive to engage
in crime and, in doing so, reduce the amount of crime that occurs. However, when
applied to neighbourhoods where organised crime is prevalent, this argument breaks
down. When a policy is implemented, criminal organisations may adjust its inputs,
substituting towards increasing the intensity of violence. This may increase the loss
society suffers at the hands of organised crime.
This paper has shown the effects of several popular policies in such an environment.
As criminal organisations tend to operate within a well-defined geographical territory,
they act as a monopsonist employer for all criminals within that territory. Irrespective
of whether the organisation operated a single wage or more complicated recruitment
strategy, results were shown to be robust.
The effects of policy depend upon the degree of complementarity between inputs in
the criminal organisation’s revenue function. If they are strong complements, policies
that one input reduce the marginal profitability of the other. Both size and violence
decline. Conversely, if they are weak revenue complements, the organisation may choose
to substitute between size and violence, possibly undoing the some of the effects of the
policy. In this case the loss society suffers may increase.
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When there is an incentive to substitute, policies which simply increase the oppor-
tunity cost of joining a criminal organisation, such as improved labour market wages
or more severe punishment, fair badly. As they do not affect youths’ incentive to ac-
quire criminal skill, they actually reduce the marginal cost of violence. Those who chose
to remain in the organisation after the policy is implemented are highly skilled. They
do not require as much compensation when violence is intensified. As such, criminal
organisations will always choose to increase violence, at the expense of membership.
Other policies prove more effective. Prevention of juvenile crime and improved ar-
rest or conviction rates may cause an intensification of violence, but only in relatively
extreme circumstances. Otherwise, these policies diminish both the organisation’s size
and violence. Preventing juvenile crime not only increases the opportunity cost of join-
ing a criminal organisation, but also reduces the incentive to acquire criminal skill. By
doing so, it increases not only the marginal cost of acquiring members, but also the
marginal cost of violence. Improving arrest rates have a similar effect. As youths may
be prevented from receiving their wages, they require more compensation ex ante for
the violence they inflict. As such, the marginal cost of violence once again increases. If
the degree of substitutability between size and violence is particularly large, then the
criminal organisation may still choose to substitute away from size towards violence.
Otherwise, it will reduce both its size and the violence it inflicts.
In summary, anti-crime policies are most effective against organised crime when they
not only reduce the incentive of youths to join the organisation, but also hamper its
ability to increase violence.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, note that M = N is never profit maximising, as it involves the gang paying
infinitely large wages. Also, if V ∗ = 0 or M∗ = 0, equilibrium profit for the gang, Π∗, is
non-positive. So, to prove that the gang will operate with positive V and M , it will be
necessary to show that positive profits will result.
Now, the first order conditions for profit maximisation are:
ΠV = MrV (M
∗, V ∗)− M
∗
c∗M (1− p)
≡ 0
ΠM = r (M
∗, V ∗) +MrM (M∗, V ∗)− g (M∗, V ∗)− V
∗
λσMc∗M (1− p)
≡ 0
Given that the revenue function has constant returns to scale, rV +MrMV = −V rV V =
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−M
V
(2rM +MrMM). Substituting appropriately, this yields second-order conditions:
ΠMM = − V
∗
M∗
1
M∗c∗M (1− p)
[
η + 1 +
1
λσM
(
1 +
1
λσM
+
1
λσM
1 + εM
2 + εM
)]
ΠMV =
1
M∗c∗M (1− p)
[
η − 1
λσM
1 + εM
2 + εM
]
ΠV V = −M
∗
V ∗
1
M∗c∗M (1− p)
[
η + 1− 1
2 + εM
]
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are that ΠMM < 0, ΠV V < 0,
and ΠV V ΠMM − Π2MV > 0. The first of these conditions is satisfied unambiguously
upon inspection, since rV + MrMV > 0. The second condition is satisfied if and only
if η > 1
2+εM
− 1. A sufficient condition is that η > −1
2
. Thirdly, we require that
ΠV V ΠMM > Π
2
MV . With relatively little work, it can be shown that this is satisfied if
and only if:
η >
1 + 1
λσM
(
1 + εM
2+εM
)
+ 1
λ2σ2M
2− 1
2+εM
+ 1
λσM
(
2 + εM
2+εM
)
+ 1
λ2σ2M
(
1 + εM
2+εM
) − 1
A sufficient condition is that η > 0. So any point where both first order conditions are
satisfied constitutes a local maximum. Rearranging these conditions yields:∣∣∣∣ΠMVΠV V
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣ΠMMΠMV
∣∣∣∣
Note that these inequalities do not simply hold at a point of profit maximisation -
they hold everywhere. Therefore, assuming that the sign of ΠMV never changes, any
profit maximising point will be unique.
Finally, it remains to show that the profit derived by the gang in any such equilibrium
is positive. From the first-order conditions, we have that V ∗M∗rV (M∗, V ∗) = M
∗V ∗
c∗M (1−p)
and M∗ (r (M∗, V ∗) +M∗rM (M∗, V ∗)− g (M∗, V ∗)) = M∗V ∗c∗M (1−p)(lnN+ln(1−p)−lnM∗) . Not-
ing that the gang level revenue function is homogeneous of degree one, it is clear that:
Π∗ =
M∗V ∗ (1 + lnN + ln (1− p)− lnM∗)
c∗M (1− p) (lnN + ln (1− p)− lnM∗)
> 0
This completes the proof.
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B Proof of Proposition 4
A contract is implementable if it is incentive compatible and individually rational. Con-
sidering first the issue of incentive compatibility, a youth has a strict incentive to truth-
fully reveal their type if:
σ = arg max
s≥0
{
(1− p) g (s)− pf − V (s)
c∗
− kC
(
c∗
σ
)}
where c∗ is a function of both σ and V . Taking first-order conditions, this is equivalent
to:
(1− p) ∂g
∂s
(σ) ≡ 1
c∗
∂V
∂s
(σ)
Integrating both sides over the range [σM , σ] yields:
g (σ) = g (σM) +
V (σ)
c∗M (1− p)
− V (σM)
c∗M (1− p)
+
1
1− p
∫ σ
t=σM
V (t)
c∗2
∂c∗
∂t
dt
Now, for σM to be the marginal youth, it must be the case that G (σM , σM) = w.
Otherwise, if G (σM , σM) > w, a lower ability youth will be able to gain a larger payoff
by joining the gang and sending signal si = σM , contradicting the fact that σˆ is the
marginal youth. On the other hand, if G (σM , σM) < w, then the marginal youth would
strictly prefer to join the primary labour market, again providing a contradiction. So:
g (σM) =
w + pf
1− p +
V (σM)
c∗M (1− p)
+
k
1− pC
(
c∗M
σM
)
Also, we have that:
∂
∂σ
(
kC
(
c∗
σ
))
=
k
σ
C ′
(
c∗
σ
)
∂c∗
∂σ
− kc
∗
σ2
C ′
(
c∗
σ
)
=
V (σ)
c∗2
∂c∗
∂σ
− kc
∗
σ2
C ′
(
c∗
σ
)
So, by (18):∫ σ
t=σM
V (t)
c∗2
∂c∗
∂t
dt = k
∫ σ
t=σM
∂
∂t
(
C
(
c∗
t
))
dt+
∫ σ
t=σM
kc∗
t2
C ′
(
c∗
t
)
dt
= kC
(
c∗
σ
)
− kC
(
c∗M
σM
)
+
∫ σ
t=σM
V (t)
tc∗
dt
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Substituting, we have that:
g (σ) =
w + pf
1− p +
V (σ)
c∗ (1− p) +
k
1− pC
(
c∗
σ
)
+
1
1− p
∫ σ
t=σM
V (t)
tc∗
dt
Finally, we must show that this is individually rational. The implementable payoff
from joining the gang is:
w +
∫ σ
t=σM
V (t)
tc∗
dt
For any youth with σ > σM , the payoff from joining the gang strictly exceeds the
wage they would earn in the primary labour market. For the marginal youth, the two
are equal. For any youth with ability less than the marginal youth, they strictly prefer
the primary labour market. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 5
Before evaluating the profit maximisation problem, consider the expected cost of infor-
mational rent for the gang:
I =
1
1− p
∫ ∞
s=σM
∫ s
t=σM
V (t)
tc∗
dtλe−λ(s−σM )ds
Performing a standard integration by parts yields:
I =
1
1− p
∫ ∞
s=σM
V (s)
λsc∗
λe−λ(s−σM )ds
so the gang leadership’s objective function becomes:
N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM
[
r (M,V (s))− w + pf
1− p −
V (s)
c∗ (1− p)
(
1 +
1
λs
)
− k
1− pC
(
c∗
s
)]
λe−λsds
Now, given gang size, for each σ ≥ σM , the restricted demand for V must maximise
pi (M,V ) . It must therefore satisfy:
piV = rV
(
V˜ ,M
)
− 1
c∗ (1− p)
[
1 +
1
λσ
1 + ε
2 + ε
]
≡ 0
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The associated second-order condition is:
piV V = rV V
(
M, V˜
)
+
rV
(
V˜ ,M
)
V˜ (2 + ε)
− ε
V˜ c∗ (1− p) (2 + ε)3
1
λσ
(
1 +
c∗
σ
C ′′′
(
c∗
σ
)
C ′′
(
c∗
σ
) − ε)
By assumption, the final term is positive. So the second-order condition is unam-
biguously negative if:
rV V
(
M, V˜
)
+
rV
(
M, V˜
)
V˜ (2 + ε)
< 0
A sufficient condition is η
(
M, V˜ (σ)
)
> −1
2
. This completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 6
Making liberal use of the envelope theorem, the gang’s optimal size, M∗, satisfies the
following first-order condition:
ΠM = rˆ − w + pf
1− p −
Vˆ
cˆ (1− p)
(
1 +
1
λσM
)
− k
1− pC
(
c∗M
σM∗
)
+N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
rM
(
M∗, V˜ (s,M∗)
)
λe−λsds ≡ 0
where rˆ ≡ r
(
M∗, V˜ (σM∗ ,M∗)
)
and Vˆ ≡ V˜ (σM∗ ,M∗). The associated second-order
condition is:
ΠMM = 2rˆM − Vˆ
λσM∗M∗cˆ (1− p)
[
1 +
1
λσM∗
3 + 2εM∗
2 + εM∗
]
+N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
[
rMM − r
2
MV
piV V
]
λe−λsds
Consider the final term:
I = N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
[
rMM − r
2
MV
piV V
]
λe−λsds
= MrˆMM −M rˆ
2
MV
pˆiV V
+N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
rMMV
∂V
∂s
e−λsds
−2N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
rMV rMV V
piV V
∂V
∂s
e−λsds+N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
r2MV
pi2V V
∂3pi
∂V 2∂s
e−λsds
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where
rˆ2MV
pˆiV V
= ∂V˜
∂M
(M∗). By assumption:
N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
rMMV
∂V
∂s
e−λsds− 2N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
rMV rMV V
piV V
∂V
∂s
e−λsds
+N (1− p)
∫ ∞
s=σM∗
r2MV
pi2V V
∂3pi
∂V 2∂s
e−λsds < 0.
So:
ΠMM < 2rˆM − Vˆ
λσM∗M∗cˆ (1− p)
[
1 +
1
λσM∗
3 + 2εM∗
2 + εM∗
]
+M∗rˆMM −M∗ rˆ
2
MV
pˆiV V
The right hand side is negative if and only if:
2rˆM pˆiV V − Vˆ
λσM∗M∗
rˆV pˆiV V − Vˆ
λ2σ2M∗M
∗cˆ (1− p) pˆiV V +M
∗rˆMM pˆiV V −M∗rˆ2MV > 0
⇐⇒ rˆM rˆV V + rˆMγ + 1
λσM∗
rˆM (rˆV V + γ)− Vˆ
λ2σ2M∗M
∗cˆ (1− p) (rˆV V + γ)
+M∗rˆMM
(
γ − rˆV
Vˆ
)
− rˆM rˆV
Vˆ
> 0
where γ ≡ rˆV
Vˆ
1
2+ε
− ε
V˜ c∗(1−p)(2+ε)3
1
λσ
(
1 +
c∗
σ
C′′′( c
∗
σ )
C′′( c∗σ )
− ε
)
. Substituting for γ, and given
the properties of r (·, ·), it is possible to show that this is unambiguously positive. Thus
the second-order condition is invariably negative.
Now, in order to prove that this is profit-maximising, we need to show that equi-
librium profits are positive. Otherwise, the gang will simply shut down. Note that, by
the first-order condition, pi (σM ,M) > 0, since rM < 0. Moreover, the profit each youth
generates for the gang is increasing in ability for any given size:
piσi (σi,M) =
kc∗i
σ2i (1− p)
C ′
(
c∗i
σi
)
+
V˜i
c∗i (1− p)
3 + 2εi
λσi (2 + εi)
> 0
So the gang must generate positive profits in equilibrium. This completes the proof.
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